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INTRODUCTION
In the second largest state in the union, approximately 145,000
individuals are incarcerated in state prisons for felony convictions.1
These prisoners hail primarily from Texas’s largest and most diverse
cities.2 Prisons, on the other hand, are located primarily in rural, sparsely
populated, and demographically homogeneous areas of the state.3 The
movement that results when individuals are incarcerated impacts
redistricting lines, which are premised on state and federal representation
being proportional to the total population of a given area—in short: more
population, more power.
What happens when 141,500 or so Texans are not counted in the areas
in which they are from?4 What happens when, instead, they are counted
amongst the population of a community they do not participate in and are
*
Rebecca Harrison Stevens is an attorney and the Voting Rights Director for the Texas Civil
Rights Project; Meagan Taylor Harding is a senior attorney for the Texas Civil Rights Project
practicing Criminal Justice Reform; Joaquin Gonzalez is a Voting Rights Fellow for the Texas Civil
Rights Project; and Emily Eby is a Voting Rights Fellow for the Texas Civil Rights Project. Special
thanks to Savannah Kumar (J.D. Candidate, University of Texas School of Law, 2020) for her
research contributions to this article.
1. TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FY 2018 STATISTICAL REPORT 1 (2018),
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Statistical_Report_FY2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H2FZH8TJ] (reporting a total of 145,019 individuals “on hand” for Texas Department of Criminal
Justice demographics analysis and breaking the total number down into the following categories:
134,152 (prison), 7,433 (state jail), and 3,434 (Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility
Offenders)).
2. Id. at 13-15.
3. Unit Directory, TEX. DEP’T. CRIM. JUST., https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/unit_directory/
[https://perma.cc/V596-MWC6].
4. See TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING REDISTRICTING
IN TEXAS 13, 15-16 (2011), https://tlc.texas.gov/redist/pdf/2011_0819_State_Federal_Law_
TxRedist.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST2Z-DZ7Q] [hereinafter TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND
FEDERAL LAW] (“[N]o court case has mandated that prison populations be reallocated or excluded
from the population counts used for redistricting.”); see Texas Redistricting, TEX. LEGIS.
COUNCIL, https://tlc.texas.gov/redist/requirements/summary.html (“Redistricting is the revision or
replacement of existing districts, resulting in new districts with different geographical boundaries.
The basic purpose of decennial redistricting is to equalize population among electoral districts after
publication of the United States census indicates an increase or decrease in or shift of population.”).
As the Texas Constitution mandates redistricting following the publication of each federal
decennial census, this issue is of utmost importance in the coming years, as the next decennial
census takes place in 2020. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (requiring the reapportionment of
congressional seats according to population from the decennial census); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28
(requiring redistricting of state legislative seats during the legislature’s first regular session
following the publication of each United States decennial census).
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merely used as a means to make money and secure jobs?5 Through
prison gerrymandering, certain individuals in rural communities obtain
political power beyond their “one person, one vote” share.6 Take the
commonplace example: a jurisdiction in Texas has a total population of
10,000 non-incarcerated individuals, but when the incarcerated
population is added, the total skyrockets to 15,000. Since Texas felons
are ineligible to vote while in prison,7 this effectively provides the 10,000
non-incarcerated individuals with more political power than another
jurisdiction with no prison population.8 Texas’s redistricting practice of
including prisoners in the population count based on where they reside
on census day, which means where they are imprisoned, in combination
with its felon disenfranchisement law, unnecessarily obliterates “one
person, one vote” and reduces accountability for elected officials.9
I. GERRYMANDERING PRISONS
A. Gerrymandering
Manipulation of the political process is the scourge of democracy.
Arguably, the worst of these manipulations is gerrymandering. The
United States Supreme Court has held that electoral districts require

5. See Jonathan Tilove, Prisoners Can’t Vote, But They Can Subtly Shift Political
Power, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, https://www.statesman.com/news/20131201/prisonerscant-vote-but-they-can-subtly-shift-political-power [https://perma.cc/4QRX-3N8R] (last updated
Sept. 25, 2018, 9:45 AM) (noting a consensus among local officials to exclude the incarcerated
population in local redistricting, at odds with state officials who include the incarcerated population
in their redistricting).
6. See Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass Incarceration,
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1241-42 (2012) (“When district population counts include
incarcerated populations, people who live close to the prison are given more of a say in government
than everybody else. The practice of using prison populations to dilute the voices of residents in
other districts is referred to as ‘prison gerrymandering.’”).
7. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002(a)(4) (West 2017); see TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.001-11.002 (West 2017) (defining eligibility and qualifications for voting).
8. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 15 (“Prisons are not
distributed uniformly throughout districts used to elect government officials, and thus some districts
rely more on their prison population to make up their total population than others. . . . [S]ince
prisons are more likely to be located in rural areas and inmates are likely to be from urban areas,
the presence of a prison may artificially enhance the voting strength of rural voters.”).
9. Id. (“As the number of persons incarcerated has grown, concentrations of prison
populations may dilute the influence of some voters and enhance the influence of others.”).
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continuous redrawing to reflect population shifts.10 This process is more
commonly known as redistricting.11 Additionally, the population of
these districts must be generally equal to each other.12 The individuals
tasked with drawing state and federal districts, often politicians, rely on
the population figures provided every ten years by the United States
Census.13
Politicians, however, often use redistricting as an opportunity to
gerrymander.14 Gerrymandering occurs when a political faction attempts
to solidify power by drawing district maps in ways that are racially and
politically discriminatory.15 These politicians effectively choose their
voters, rather than the voters choosing them.
Unfortunately,
gerrymandering is almost as old as the United States.16 For hundreds of
years, politicians have drawn district maps with one goal in mind: to stay
in power.17 Texas politicians are no exception.18
B. Gerrymandering in Texas
Any discussion of redistricting in Texas necessarily takes place against
the backdrop of the state’s controversial history with impermissible

10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-66, 577 (1964).
11. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 23-24.
12. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-66, 577 (1964) (holding the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution requires “that a State make an honest and good faith effort
to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is
practicable.”).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
14. See Al Kauffman, Opinion, Supreme Court Sets Stage for Partisan Gerrymandering
Standards, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (June 30, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://
www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Supreme-Court-sets-stage-for-partisan-130
38365.php [https://perma.cc/8MHK-AF2R] (alleging the Wisconsin, Texas, and Maryland
legislatures engaged in gerrymandering for partisan benefit and to discriminate along racial and
ethnic lines).
15. Id.
16. CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS
DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY 97-98 (2018) (“In 1810, when Massachusetts governor Elbridge
Gerry drew a district in the shape of a salamander to corral his rivals and neutralize their influence,
the term ‘gerrymander’ became a descriptive and ongoing part of the American political lexicon
and life.”).
17. Id.
18. Stephen Young, Texas Legal Fight Over Redistricting Isn’t Over, DALL. OBSERVER,
(Dec. 3, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/texas-redistricting-fight-is-nevergoing-to-die-11396118 [https://perma.cc/BT6G-7KLY].
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gerrymandering and voting-related discrimination. The Supreme Court
repeatedly struck down all-White Democratic primaries in Texas,19
which paved the way for later landmark decisions that established the
Testimony on anti-Latinx
“one person, one vote” standard.20
discrimination in Texas was a central component of expanding the
coverage of the Voting Rights Act in 1975.21 The Texas legislature’s
efforts to disenfranchise through redistricting gave the state an
ignominious reputation for repeatedly engaging in gerrymandering. For
example, in White v. Regester, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
multimember legislative districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties because
the scheme diluted the votes of certain minority racial groups,22
subsequently setting the groundwork for the modern “discriminatory
effects” test contained in Section Two of the Voting Rights Act.23 In
every decennial redistricting cycle since 1970, courts have found Texas’s
proposed legislative districts to violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965.24
After the Supreme Court struck down the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance formula,25 Section Two became one of the primary tools
used to fight discriminatory redistricting practices.
More recently, in Evenwel v. Abbott, Texans who live in Texas Senate
districts with large registered voter populations unsuccessfully
19. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65
(1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953).
20. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 247 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing the White
primary cases as precedent establishing the Court’s authority to strike down unconstitutional
electoral practices).
21. See Charles L. Cotrell & R. Michael Stevens, The 1975 Voting Rights Act and San
Antonio, Texas: Toward a Federal Guarantee of a Republican Form of Local Government, 8
PUBLIUS 79, 90 (1978) (recognizing a shift from an individualistic to cultural application of the
Equal Protection Clause by adding “language minorities” as a component of race).
22. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (“Plainly, under our cases, multimember
districts are not per se unconstitutional, nor are they necessarily unconstitutional when used in
combination with single-member districts in other parts of the State. But we have entertained
claims that multimember districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of racial groups.”).
23. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (“Congress substantially revised § 2
to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to
establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test,’ applied by this Court in White v.
Regester[.]”).
24. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 240 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Veasey v. Perry,
71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 830 F.3d 216
(5th Cir. 2016).).
25. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
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challenged Texas’s use of total population for redistricting.26 They
argued that the eligible voter population is a more appropriate metric, as
opposed to the total population figure, because the total population figure
dilutes the votes of citizens that belong to districts where large numbers
of registered voters reside.27 Although the districts’ total population size
varies by about 8%, the districts “measured by a voter-population
baseline—eligible voters or registered voters—the map’s maximum
population deviation exceeds 40%.”28 By upholding the Texas
Legislature’s map, districts with low voter-populations held as much
voting power as districts with almost double the number of registered
voters.
Texas does not limit the practice of gerrymandering to only
congressional offices.29 Countless local political subdivisions run afoul
of the United States Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.30 Given the
demographic characteristics of Texas prison populations,31 the choice by
Texas lawmakers on where to allocate prison populations for redistricting
and whether to grant prisoners voting rights cannot be considered in a
vacuum. The state’s official history of voting-related discrimination
underscores the combined discriminatory effect of prison
gerrymandering and felon disenfranchisement.

26. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123, 1126, 1131 (2016) (“As history,
precedent, and practice demonstrate, it is plainly permissible for jurisdictions to measure
equalization by the total population of state and local legislative districts” and doing so “serves
both the State’s interest in preventing vote dilution and [the Court’s] interest in ensuring equality
of representation.”) (emphasis in original).
27. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (2016).
28. Id.
29. See TOM HOWE, H. RESEARCH ORG., INTERIM NEWS, NO. 81-5, WHERE SHOULD
INMATES BE COUNTED FOR REDISTRICTING? 8 (2010), https://hro.house.texas.gov/pdf/
interim/int81-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC2U-XA3F] (indicating it can also affect precincts for
county commissioners, justices of the peace, and constables).
30. See, e.g., LULAC v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1071, 1093 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
(finding that North East Independent School District’s at-large electoral system violated section
two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, denying Hispanics and Blacks an equal opportunity to elect
school board candidates of their choice); see also, e.g., Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d
667, 674 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding the City of Pasadena’s map and plan for electing its city council
violated section two of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment because Pasadena
specifically intended to dilute Latino voters).
31. TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1 (finding that 66% of inmates in Texas
are Black or Hispanic).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol21/iss2/1

6

Harrison Stevens et al.: Handcuffing the Vote

2019]

HANDCUFFING THE VOTE

201

C. Gerrymandering Correctional Facilities
Gerrymandering correctional facilities is the practice of counting
inmate populations towards the district that physically houses the
correctional facility, despite the fact that the inmate did not reside in that
district prior to their incarceration.32 Given Texas’s history of
impermissible gerrymandering and overt racial discrimination, the issue
of gerrymandering correctional facilities requires an approach that
considers how past and present socio-political-economic conditions
intertwine to create racial disparities.33 Ultimately, the focus should be
on the underlying intent of state and local redistricting policies.
In Texas, the total population of a given jurisdiction, not the total
number of eligible voters, governs representation.34 For the purpose of
redistricting, Texas counts inmates towards the population where they are
incarcerated.35 Counting inmates in this manner artificially increases the
total population of representative districts that operate a correctional
facility, giving these districts greater representational power.36 The
increase in population figures for these districts negatively affects
representation for districts whose residents are incarcerated in a different
district. This distortion is particularly unjust when the inmate intends to
return home after serving their sentence.37 There can be dramatic
concrete implications to this practice. For instance, in 2011, the exclusion
of incarcerated individuals from the population count in Harris County
resulted in the county losing one seat in the Texas House of

32. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 15.
33. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 15 (“[B]ecause
prisoners are disproportionately likely to be members of racial or ethnic minority groups, the
presence of a prison could give the appearance that a district is a minority opportunity district when
it is not.”).
34. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).
35. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26 (apportioning representation based on “ . . . the population
of the State, as ascertained by the most recent United States census . . .”); see also Final 2020
Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525, 5535 (Feb. 8, 2018)
(“Prisoners are counted at the facility.”).
36. Eric Lotke & Peter Wagner, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral and Financial
Consequences of Counting Prisoners Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24 PACE L.
REV. 587, 599 (2004).
37. See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 13-15 (showing 58,537 people
incarcerated in TDCJ facilities who were convicted in Bexar, Dallas, Harris, Tarrant, and Travis
counties).
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Representatives.38 This loss was used as a justifications by state
lawmakers to combine two Harris County districts with large minority
populations, resulting in an overall dilution of voting power for these
historically disenfranchised communities.39
The way the state treats prison populations when drawing state and
federal legislative districts contrasts with how local political
subdivisions, such as counties, treat prison populations. Generally, local
jurisdictions do not include inmate populations when redistricting. Many
local Texas voting precincts count inmates towards the voting precinct
where the inmate resided before their incarceration.40 In fact, several
counties in Texas already remove inmates from the population count for
the purpose of redistricting for county commissioner.41 Notably, districts
in Concho County and Garza County could, if drawn to include the
incarcerated population, consist almost entirely of inmates.42 Thus, to
protect the “one person, one vote” standard, redistricting should exclude
the incarcerated population from the total population count in the area of
the correctional facility, unless the inmate previously resided in the
district where the correctional facility exists.43 Furthermore, at least until
the inmate serves their sentence, the district where the inmate resided
prior to incarceration should continue to count the inmate towards their
38. Ross Ramsey, Prisoners Don’t Vote, but They Sometimes Count, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 30,
2011, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/09/30/prisoners-dont-vote-they-sometimescount/ [https://perma.cc/9NNP-6RFK].
39. See id. (“On the new maps recently approved by the Republican-dominated Legislature,
lawmakers drew Reps. Scott Hochberg and Hubert Vo, both Democrats, into the same district,
knowing only one can survive the election year.”).
40. Compare TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 2017) (“A person who is an inmate
in a penal institution . . . does not, while an inmate, acquire residence at the place where the
institution is located.”), with TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26 (apportioning representation based on
“ . . . the population of the State, as ascertained by the most recent United States census . . .”), and
Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525, 5535 (Feb. 8,
2018) (“Prisoners are counted at the facility.”); see also Tilove, supra note 5 (quoting then-Judge
Bill Coleman of Hale County).
41. See Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering After the 2010 Census: Texas,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 2010), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states/TX.html
[https://perma.cc/8DK9-ABAU] (stating Anderson, Bee, Brazos, Childress, Concho, Coryell,
Dawson, Grimes, Karnes, Madison, Mitchell, Pecos, Walker, and Wood Counties excluded prison
populations for County Commissioner precincts after the 2000 census, especially noting that
excluding the prison population in Concho County avoided a County Commissioner precinct of
only incarcerated persons).
42. Id.; Tilove, supra note 5.
43. TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, supra note 4, at 16.
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population.44 As mass incarceration balloons, Texas must address the
issue of properly counting the inmate population at all levels of the voting
redistricting scheme.
II. UN-HANDCUFFING THE VOTE
Solution: Count Inmates Towards Their Home Populations
An appropriate remedy to the disproportionate representation created
by prison gerrymandering would require the National Census Bureau
(“Census Bureau”) to amend its counting procedure to count prisoners
based on their residence prior to incarceration rather than the voting
precinct where they are incarcerated.45 This would prevent the overrepresentation of rural, less-populated districts and the underrepresentation of urban districts struggling with mass incarceration.46
44. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(a) (West 2017) (defining residence as “one’s home
and fixed place of habitation to which one intends to return after any temporary absence.”)
(emphasis added); see also Doyle v. State, No. 09–14–00458–CR, 2016 WL 908299, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Mar. 9, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) cert. denied
sub nom. Doyle v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 581 (2016) (overruling a void for vagueness challenge on the
Texas Election Code’s residence definition); see also TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West
2017) (indicating only that inmates do not acquire residence in the “penal institution” by
incarceration); but see TEX. CONST. art. III, §26 (deferring to the U.S. census), and Final 2020
Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525, 5535 (Feb. 8, 2018)
(counting prisoners as residents of the prison). See TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note
1, at 2-3 (showing the amount of inmates received by TDCJ facilities in 2018 was roughly
equivalent to inmates released in the same year); see also HOWE, supra note 29, at 11 (“When these
inmates return [home], they will need services and resources their home districts might not have
been able to secure due to the temporary loss of population and political power.”).
45. See Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525,
5527 (Feb. 8, 2018) (“Of the 77,887 comments pertaining to prisoners, 77,863 suggested that
prisoners should be counted at their home or pre-incarceration address.”); see also Peter Wagner
& Rose Heyer, Importing Constituents: Prisoners and Political Clout in Texas, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 8, 2004), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/texas/importing.html
[https://perma.cc/UR2V-XGV9] (observing that in the past the Census Bureau changed its policy
to address evolving demographics, such as college students attending school in places other than
their hometowns).
46. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018) (counting
“individuals incarcerated in the State of federal correctional facilities, as determined by the
decennial census, at their last known residence before incarceration if the individuals were residents
of the State.”); see also, e.g., N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2019) (“[A]ll
incarcerated persons shall be, where possible, allocated for redistricting purposes . . . at their
respective residential addresses prior to incarceration rather than at the addresses of such
correctional facilities. For all incarcerated persons whose residential address prior to incarceration
was outside of the state, or for whom the task force cannot identify their prior residential address,
and for all persons confined in a federal correctional facility on census day, the task force shall
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In 2011, the Census Bureau took a small step forward and released data
on “group quarters” counts earlier than usual, which gave states more
discretion on whether to “[l]eave the prisoners counted where the prisons
are, delete them from redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other
locale.”47 The Census Bureau counts inmates towards the city where
they bunk for “pragmatic and administrative reasons, not legal ones.”48
Moreover, the Census Bureau said that each state can define population
for redistricting purposes.49 In doing so, the Census Bureau addressed
criticism that the method of counting inmates detrimentally affected state
representation.50 The 2011 release of group quarters data provided Texas
with an opportunity to reevaluate the way it counts inmates in
redistricting schemes. States like Maryland and New York took
advantage of this opportunity by enacting legislation to end the practice
of counting inmates towards their location of incarceration.51
Maryland’s law, appropriately named the “No Representation Without
Population Act,” counts inmates that are residents of Maryland towards
their home district.52 The Act excludes from the population count
inmates incarcerated in Maryland that resided outside of Maryland prior

consider those persons to have been counted at an address unknown[.]”). See also ERIKA L. WOOD,
DĒMOS, IMPLEMENTING REFORM: HOW MARYLAND & NEW YORK ENDED PRISON
GERRYMANDERING 3 (2014), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/implement
ingreform.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG9C-UY6E] (“A legislator whose district depends on the people
incarcerated in a correctional facility to meet[] its population requirement has every incentive to
keep that prison not just open, but filled to capacity.”).
47. WOOD, supra note 46, at 6; see also Poverty: Group Quarters/Residence Rules,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/groupquarters.html [https://perma.cc/PW5H-8LCP] (“The Census Bureau classifies all people not living
in housing units (house, apartment, mobile home, rented rooms) as living in group quarters. There
are two types of group quarters: Institutional such as correctional facilities . . . [and] NonInstitutional, such as college dormitories . . . [.]”).
48. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895 (D. Md. 2011) (concluding states’
adjustment of census data during the redistricting process is consistent with the practices of the
Census Bureau itself).
49. Robert Groves, So, How Do You Handle Prisons?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2010/03/so-how-do-you-han
dle-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/M6S9-8YPV] (stating the Bureau planned to release counts of
inmates early in the 2010 Census so that states could use the data for redistricting purposes).
50. WOOD, supra note 46, at 6.
51. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW
§ 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2019).
52. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018)
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to their incarceration.53 The law offers significant correction to
disproportionate districts when reasonable efforts to locate a prisoner’s
last known address fail.54
The Supreme Court found Maryland’s “No Representation Without
Population Act” constitutional, affording protection for other states to
enact similar legislation.55 The Supreme Court rejected the argument
that states are constitutionally required to use the data provided by the
Census Bureau without deviation in order to comply with the “one
person, one vote” standard.56 Thus, if states choose to make adjustments,
they must develop a non-arbitrary, systematic process.57
New York’s law requires counting inmates in state correctional
facilities towards their home districts and only counting them towards
state and local districts if they were residents of New York prior to
incarceration.58 Meanwhile, inmates in federal correctional institutions,
inmates with a residency address outside of the State of New York prior
to their incarceration, or inmates with an unknown address are not
included in the redistricting count.59 New York’s counting of inmates
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Fletcher v. Lamone, 567 U.S. 930 (2012) (mem.).
56. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F.Supp.2d 887, 894-95 (D. Md. 2011) (“We believe that the
plaintiffs fail to read the Karcher and Kirkpatrick statements in their fuller context. Although
Karcher and Kirkpatrick do require states to use census data as a starting point, they do not hold,
as the plaintiffs maintain, that states may not modify this data to correct perceived flaws. A more
complete reading of the opinion in Karcher makes this point clear. The Court there recognized that
‘the census may systematically undercount population, and the rate of undercounting may vary
from place to place.’ It cautioned, however, that ‘[i]f a State does attempt to use a measure other
than total population or to “correct” the census figures, it may not do so in a haphazard, inconsistent,
or conjectural manner.’ . . . . Taken together, these Karcher statements suggest that a State may
choose to adjust the census data, so long as those adjustments are thoroughly documented and
applied in a nonarbitrary fashion and they otherwise do not violate the Constitution.”) (first quoting
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983); then quoting Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732 n. 4 (citing
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1969))).
57. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894-95 (D. Md. 2011); Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969).
58. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m (Consol. 2011) (“The task force shall use such data to develop
a database in which all incarcerated persons shall be, where possible, allocated for redistricting
purposes, such that each geographic unit reflects incarcerated populations at their respective
residential addresses prior to incarceration rather than at the addresses of such correctional
facilities.”).
59. Id. (“For all incarcerated persons whose residential address prior to incarceration was
outside of the state, or for whom the task force cannot identify their prior residential address, and
for all persons confined in a federal correctional facility on census day, the task force shall consider
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for redistricting purposes is different from Maryland’s because Maryland
requires counting inmates with unknown addresses towards the facility’s
address.60 In 2011, the New York State Supreme Court found the New
York law did not violate the New York State Constitution, which requires
that the legislature use the census to appropriate inhabitants for the
purpose of drawing districts within the state.61
As discussed in Part I, some local officials recognize that part of
protecting “one person, one vote” requires that prisoners be removed
from the total population count of the district within which they are
imprisoned.62 State officials, however, are not as amenable to the
exclusion of inmate populations for the purpose of drawing state
districts.63 While the Texas Constitution does not explicitly define
“population,”64 the Texas Election Code provides that, “A person who is
an inmate in a penal institution or who is an involuntary inmate in a
hospital or an eleemosynary institution does not, while an inmate, acquire
residence at the place where the institution is located.”65 In light of this
discrepancy, one Texas district court interpreted the Texas Constitution
to require a strict application of the data provided by the Census
Bureau.66 The New York Supreme Court reached the opposite
those persons to have been counted at an address unknown and persons at such unknown address
shall not be included in such data set created pursuant to this paragraph.”).
60. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01(2) (West 2018).
61. Order and Decision, Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011, at 7-8 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 1,
2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Decision%20and%20Order_1%2
0(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YG-RV7S] (explaining how inmates may be physically present in the
locations of the correctional facilities at the time of the census count, however, they lack actual
permanency as they can be transferred between the state’s many correctional facilities at DOCCS’s
discretion).
62. HOWE, supra note 29 (estimating more than 100 local governments exclude inmate
populations when drawing representative districts).
63. Id. (“During the 2009 regular session of the 81st Texas Legislature, the House
Corrections Committee heard testimony on . . . HB 2855 . . . which would have required Texas to
count inmates at their addresses before incarceration. During the 2001 regular session, the House
Elections Committee favorably reported a similar bill, HB 2639 . . . which the House rejected by
48-91-3. In addition, U.S. Rep. Gene Green, D-Houston, has filed a bill in Congress (H.R. 2075)
that would require the Census Bureau to count inmates at their previous addresses for the 2020
Census.”).
64. TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 25-26 (amended Nov. 6, 2001).
65. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 2017).
66. Perez v. Texas, Nos. 11–CA–360–OLG–JES–XR, SA–CA–361–OLG–JES–XR, SA–
11–CA–490–OLG–JES–XR, SA–11– CA–592–OLG–JES–XR, SA–11– CA–615–OLG–JES–XR,
SA–11–CA–635–OLG–JES–XR, 2011 WL 9160142, at 12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2011) (unpublished
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conclusion from that of the Texas court, despite having very similar
constitutions.67 The New York Constitution states:
Except as herein otherwise provided, the federal census taken in the year
nineteen hundred thirty and each federal census taken decennially
thereafter shall be controlling as to the number of inhabitants in the state
or any part thereof for the purposes of the apportionment of members of
assembly and readjustment or alteration of senate and assembly districts
next occurring, in so far as such census and the tabulation thereof purport
to give the information necessary therefor.68

In Little v. LATFOR, the New York Supreme Court noted that the Census
Bureau directed that states exercise discretion to “create their own
methodology for counting inmates for apportionment purposes.”69
While the New York Constitution mandated the use of census data for
redistricting purposes, the Court found that the inmates were not within
the meaning of “inhabitants” because they lacked “actual permanency”
or an “intent to remain” incarcerated.70 Thus, the court found that a
deviation from the strict application of the census data did not violate the
state’s constitution.71
The Texas Constitution is similar to the New York Constitution
because they both require the use of census data to calculate the number
of inhabitants for redistricting purposes.72 Texas must use the numbers
table decision) (“The Texas Election Code states that prisoners are not residents, for voting
purposes, of the county where they are incarcerated. Nevertheless, the U.S. Census Bureau counts
them as such, and the Texas Constitution requires use of the census count as the basis for
redistricting.”) (citation omitted) (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 2017) (citing
TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26).
67. Order and Decision, Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011, at 7-8 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 1,
2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Decision%20and%20Order_1%2
0(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YG-RV7S].
68. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (amended 2014).
69. Order and Decision, Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011, at 6 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 1,
2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Decision%20and%20Order_1%2
0(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YG-RV7S] (“In March 2010, Groves stated that the Census Bureau
counts individuals at their ‘usual residence’ and that, for inmates in particular, states were free to
decide the manner in which prisoners were counted, namely, at the prisons, at their preincarceration addresses or altogether removed from ‘redistricting formulas’ where residential
information was unavailable.”).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Compare N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (amended 2014) (“[E]ach federal census taken
decennially thereafter shall be controlling as to the number of inhabitants in the state or any part
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provided by the Census Bureau to draw its districts. The requirement by
the Texas Constitution does not, however, prohibit redistricting schemes
to count inmates as residing in their home districts. Who counts as
“population” is the relevant inquiry.
The Texas Legislature has the authority to define “population” in a
manner that counts inmates towards their home district, and not towards
the district where the correctional facility is located. In doing so, the
Texas Legislature can correct the disproportional representation afforded
to mostly rural districts and help restore the “one person, one vote”
principle. Undoubtedly, the Texas Legislature uses redistricting as a
mechanism to retain power almost exclusively within one party. The
current redistricting approach creates a supermajority in the hands of one
political party, and there is little incentive to change the way redistricting
schemes use correctional facilities to curve the population figures in their
favor. With one legal challenge to the current map held in their favor, the
prison gerrymandering practice is likely to remain in place in Texas, at
least for the foreseeable future.73
Solution: Restoring Voting Privileges
Turning to another aspect of the gerrymandering conundrum and the
vestiges of Jim Crow: Texans lose their right to vote upon felony
These two issues—gerrymandering and felon
conviction.74
disenfranchisement—work in tandem to strip inmates of representation.
The Eighth Amendment provides the best vehicle for abolishing felon
disenfranchisement.

thereof for the purposes of the apportionment of member of assembly and readjustment or alteration
of senate and assembly districts . . . .”), with TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26 (“The members of the House
of Representatives shall be apportioned among the several counties, according to the number of
population in each, as nearly as may be, on a ratio obtained by dividing the population of the State,
as ascertained by the most recent United States census . . . .”).
73. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895-96 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
TABULATING PRISONERS AT THEIR “PERMANENT HOME OF RECORD” ADDRESS 10 (2006),
https://felonvoting.procon.org/sourcefiles/tabulating_prisoners.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WEB5UQJ]). In 2011, Texas State Representative Harold Dutton, filed suit to challenge the practice of
counting prisoners where they are incarcerated during redistricting. The lawsuit alleged that
counting prisoners where they reside instead of based on where they are from, inflated the residents
of certain districts and resulted in disproportionate representation.
74. TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002(a)(4) (West 2017).
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1. Felon Disenfranchisement in Texas
Suffrage is the right to vote in political elections.75 Several
constitutional amendments expanded suffrage rights or removed voting
barriers. Each sought to establish or protect existing voting rights for
different groups of citizens.76 These amendments represent the
progression of a society that recognized, sometimes through reluctant
acquiescence, the value in the right to vote.77 The right to vote is the
right from which all others flow and is the most fundamental right in our
democratic government.78 Stripping prisoners of their voting rights,
while still counting them for redistricting electoral districts, undermines
the principle of “one person, one vote”.79
“Civil death” is the practice of discontinuing certain civil rights and
liberties because of the person’s criminal convictions.80 The use of civil
75. TEX. CONST. art. VI (labeling Article VI of the Texas Constitution as “Suffrage,” and
laying out the foundations of voting and elections in Texas).
76. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States of by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of the citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older,
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.”).
77. Cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Time works changes, brings
into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.
They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.”); Corinna Barrett Lain,
Lessons Learned from the Evolution of Evolving Standards, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 666-67
(2010) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s defense of a progressive reading of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause as they determined whether a punishment could also be cruel and
unusual if it was disproportionate to the crime).
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“Though not regarded strictly as a
natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society, . . . nevertheless [voting] is regarded
as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”).
79. Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current
Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 359 (2011).
80. Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitutional
No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 107 (2005) (“The idea behind civil death was the
destruction of the convicted felon’s political existence; the death sentence imposed automatically
for most felonies would destroy the person’s physical existence, but the person’s legal existence
also had to be eliminated.”).
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death as a punishment began to decline in the 1950s, but the imposition
of voting prohibitions for convicted felons survived.81 Stripping people
with felony convictions of their voting rights, also known as felon
disenfranchisement, is one of the few remaining vestiges of civil death in
the United States.82 This practice results in far reaching collateral
consequences that can cause almost insurmountable barriers for persons
exiting incarceration.
Felon disenfranchisement laws served as one pretext for limiting
Blacks from voting, particularly in the South.83 Whites in the South
became ever-increasingly concerned about the Black vote and employed
In addition to felon
a full array of methods to retain power.
disenfranchisement, Southern states used poll taxes, literacy tests, and
physical intimidation to keep Blacks from voting.84
In Texas, re-enfranchisement of post-felony conviction occurs two
years “[after] the issuance of discharge papers” from felony conviction.85
In 1997, the Texas Legislature repealed the two-year waiting period and
added more precise language that allowed automatic restoration of voting
rights upon completion of a felony sentence.86 Today, Texas bars people
from voting upon felony conviction until the end of his or her sentence,
including the completion of probation—whether community supervision
81. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1798 (2012).
82. Wilkins, supra note 80 (noting loss of citizenship and loss of legal protections among
other rights lost in a civil death).
83. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231 (1985) (concluding “discrimination
against [B]lacks, as well as against poor [W]hites, was a motivating factor for the [Alabama]
provision” that disenfranchised persons convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude); see also
Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896) (noting the crimes that disqualified people from
voting included crimes like burglary and theft—crimes Blacks were more likely to be found guilty
of—while murder and robbery convictions did not disqualify people from voting).
84. See Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 869 (Miss. 1896) (holding a poll tax in Mississippi was
employed primarily for the purpose of restricting access to voting polls); see also McLaughlin v.
City of Canton, 947 F.Supp. 954, 977 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (“After the Civil War, [B]lacks comprised
the majority of the electorate of Mississippi, since [W]hites who had supported the Confederacy
were denied the vote. . . . [T]his development was greeted by obstructionist [W]hites
with . . . disenfranchising tactics and methods, including literacy and property tests, poll taxes,
understanding clauses, and grandfather clauses. . . . Some historians have remarked that
disenfranchising provisions in state constitutions for convictions of certain “[B]lack” crimes was
one additional method explored.”).
85. House Comm. on Elections, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1001, 75th Leg., R. (1997).
86. Id. (noting the confusion arose when paroled inmates were released from custody
although not released in the sense that they had completed their felony sentence).
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or deferred adjudication.87 Therefore, people with a felony conviction in
Texas suffer a temporary civil death with respect to their voting
privileges.
Although temporal, the significance is profound. In light of mass
incarceration and conviction rates, the implications of civil death have
become even more oppressive.88 The Texas Department of Criminal
Justice has one of the largest prison population in the country in 2016.89
Between the number of inmates incarcerated and those on probation with
felony convictions, Texas barred approximately 500,000 people from
voting in 2016.90
Demographics of Texas inmates also show a disproportionate
representation of Black and Hispanic communities.91 Thus, Black and
Hispanic Texans are more likely to suffer from disenfranchisement than
White Texans. Although no longer explicitly stated and more nebulous,
felon disenfranchisement remains faithful to its original purpose: it
removes Black communities, and now Hispanic communities too, from
the voting population in significant numbers.
87. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (West 2017). Cf. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 141.001(a)(4) (West 2017) (barring a person with a felony conviction from running for office
until they have completed their sentence and received a pardon); see also Letter from
Ann McGeehan, Tex. Sec’y of State, to Voter Registrars, Effect of Felony Conviction on Voter
Registration (Aug. 3, 2004), https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/effects.shtml [https://
perma.cc/RA6F-7LT8] (noting that in Texas “there is no automatic restoration of the right to be a
candidate, as there is for voting purposes, after a full discharge. Absent a pardon, the candidate
must have obtained a judicial release from his or her disabilities in order to run for any office to
which this section applies.”).
88. See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT:
A PRIMER 3 (July 17, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Felony-Disenfranchisement-Primer.pdf. [https://perma.cc/P2MV-U9GA] (noting the prison
population ballooned from 1976 to 2016 resulting in an imprisoned population of 6.1 million
people by 2016).
89. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2016, at 4 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pd£’p16.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7CT3-V3NY] (listing California as the second state with the highest incarcerated
population).
90. State-by-State Data, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts/#
detail?state1Option=U.S.%20Total&state2Option=0 [https://perma.cc/ED2R-CMEN].
91. Compare TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 8 (estimating the
incarcerated population divided by race resulted in about 33.3% White, 32.7% Black, and 33.5%
Hispanic), with Texas Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/
TX.html [https://perma.cc/RU3W-BGHQ] (finding Black and Hispanic communities are
overrepresented in Texas prisons because Whites consist of 42% of the population in Texas while
Blacks and Hispanics make up the remaining 38% and 12% of the population, respectively).
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2. Reviewing Prior Equal Protection Arguments
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.92

This has been interpreted to expressly authorize state felon
disenfranchisement laws.93 In Richardson v. Ramirez, the seminal felon
disenfranchisement case, the Supreme Court held that California’s
practice of disenfranchising convicted felons was not a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.94 The Court was convinced that Section Two
of the Fourteenth Amendment provided an “affirmative sanction” and
that the possible intent of Congress was to allow states the right to levy
the penalty on convicted felons.95 Disappointingly, the Court accepted
the legal fiction that they had no authority to assign weight to the public
policy concerns surrounding disenfranchisement.96 Significantly, upon

92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2
93. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“We hold that the understanding of
those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of [Section] 2
and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment’s applicability to state laws
disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those other
state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
by this Court.”). Cf. id. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is clear that [Section] 2 was not intended
and should not be construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 2 provides a special remedy—reduced representation—to cure a particular form of electoral
abuse—the disenfranchisement of Negroes. There is no indication that the framers of the
provisions intended that special penalty to be the exclusive remedy for all forms of electoral
discrimination.”).
94. Id. at 54.
95. Id. (analyzing the legislative history of the passage of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
96. Accord id. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Although, in the last century, this Court may
have justified the exclusion of voters from the electoral process for fear that they would vote to
change laws considered important by a temporal majority, I have little doubt that we would not
countenance such a purpose today. The process of democracy is one of change. Our laws are not
frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in response to the needs
of a changing society.”); see, e.g., Lain, supra note 77, at 672-73, 675 (explaining how death
penalty Supreme Court decisions inconsistently consider, or depart from considering, jurisdictions,
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the passage of Section Two, Congress was aware of its potential for
discriminatory enforcement and added the language “under laws equally
applicable to all the inhabitants of said State” to protect against wholesale
disenfranchisement of Black men by allowing a State to “make one set of
laws applicable to white men, and another set of laws applicable to
colored men.”97
A little more than a decade later, the Supreme Court revisited the felon
disenfranchisement and Equal Protection question reviewing Alabama’s
disenfranchisement scheme. This time, the Court found the law
unconstitutional, anchoring its decision in the prohibition against
intentional race-based discrimination found in Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment.98 Reviewing the legislative record, the Court
found that the goal of requiring persons to be stripped of their voting
rights if convicted of certain crimes, including crimes of moral turpitude,
was to disenfranchise Black and poor White people.99 This provision ran
afoul the Equal Protection Clause and Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment which was not designed to allow intentional racial
discrimination.100
However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has appellate
jurisdiction over federal district courts in Texas, has not always
invalidated disenfranchisement laws passed with racial animus.101 In
fact, while examining the legislative record of the passage of
Mississippi’s felon disenfranchisement law, the Court determined that the
original discriminatory purpose of the law—to disenfranchise Black
people—was miraculously cured by a later amendment that added murder
and rape (and removed burglary) to the list of crimes for which voting

trends, opinions and viewpoints of relevant organizations, as the Court manipulates the meaning of
“cruel and unusual punishment” according to the ideological preferences of the sitting majority).
97. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 2600 (May 27, 1868).
98. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
99. See id. at 231-33 (emphasizing the racially discriminatory intent and effect of the statute
despite having a potentially valid reason for its enactment).
100. See id. at 232-33 (“[W]e are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the
purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of § 182 which otherwise
violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
101. See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1998) (complaining that
appellant was not disenfranchised because “armed robbery” was not the same crime as “theft” and
the discriminatory intent of section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution rendered the statute
unconstitutional).
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rights could be stripped.102 The Court was convinced that the addition
of murder and rape was indicia that the statute was no longer intended to
reduce the number of Black people who could vote, since those crimes
were not considered “Black crimes.”103
In a limited holding, the Fifth Circuit has found that the process by
which felon disenfranchisement statutes are enforced must be
administered fairly, avoiding arbitrary and selective enforcement.104 In
Williams, the petitioner alleged that Mississippi’s procedure (1)
“impermissibly select[ed] blacks for disenfranchisement” and (2) the
Board failed “to follow the statutory procedures in Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 23-5-35, 23-5-37.”105 The Court mainly took issue with the
petitioner’s second allegation and stated “[a] state may make a
completely arbitrary distinction between groups of felons so as to work a
denial of equal protection with respect to the right to vote when it
administers a statute, fair on its face, with an unequal hand.”106 With
respect to the Petitioner’s first claim—intentional selection of Blacks for
disenfranchisement—the Court articulated a test that would likely be
impossible to prove.107
The Fifth Circuit has additionally ruled that felon disenfranchisement
laws treating persons with felony convictions differently are acceptable
under rational basis scrutiny—that is, as long as there is a rational
relationship between this differential treatment and a legitimate
governmental interest.108 By utilizing various re-enfranchisement
processes for persons convicted of state felonies and federal felonies, the
Equal Protection Clause was not violated.109

102. Id. at 391.
103. Id.
104. See Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 517 (5th Cir. 1982) (“While [appellant] has no
right to vote as a convicted felon . . . he has the right not to be the arbitrary target of the Board’s
enforcement of the statute.”).
105. Id. at 515-16.
106. Id. at 515-16.
107. See id. at 517 (“Obviously, if the evidence at trial shows that the group of felons who
have not been disenfranchised are [W]hite, then it will tend to support appellant’s assertion of racial
discrimination.”).
108. Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1129 (1979).
109. Id.
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Other circuits have also rejected challenges to felon
disenfranchisement laws. The Third Circuit rejected a challenge brought
by a prisoner alleging Pennsylvania’s law violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it allowed non-incarcerated felons to vote while denying
the right to incarcerated felons.110 The Ninth Circuit has similarly held
that Section Two did not only apply to common law felonies and refusing
to restore voting rights until the completion of all conviction terms,
including payment of fines and restitution, was constitutional.111 The
Sixth Circuit declined to find that Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement
statute had a disparate impact on Black people due to the disproportionate
number of Black people convicted of felonies in the state.112 Although
the district court found racial discrimination in the original passage of the
law, and the continuation of such discriminatory effects, the Sixth Circuit
stated, “such evidence of past discrimination ‘cannot, in the manner of
original sin, condemn action that is not in itself unlawful.’”113
Even though Richardson did not foreclose all Fourteenth Amendment
challenges,114 Equal Protection arguments have not fared well in the
courts since its publication.115 Notwithstanding the disproportionate
racial impact, and at times, the racially discriminatory intent of felon
disenfranchisement laws, courts have been reluctant to deviate from

110. See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25 (3rd Cir. 1983) (“. . . Pennsylvania could rationally
determine that those convicted felons who had served their debt to society and had been released
from prison or whose crimes were not serious enough to warrant incarceration in the first instance
stand on a different footing from those felons who required incarceration and should therefore be
entitled to participate in the voting process.”).
111. See Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing plaintiff
from indigent unincarcerated felons to draw support for Arizona’s voting scheme under the rational
basis analysis).
112. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (looking beyond
evidence of historical racial discrimination in the state and viewing the issue in totality of the
circumstances to come to the “inescapable conclusion” that the Voting Rights Act was not
violated).
113. Id. at 1261 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)).
114. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (remanding respondent’s contention
that selective enforcement by county election officials violated the Equal Protection Clause to the
Supreme Court of California).
115. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) (“It is undisputed that a
state may constitutionally disenfranchise convicted felons . . . ”) (emphasis added) (citing
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 (1974)).
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Richardson.116 A different approach allowing courts more flexibility is
required.
3. Evolving Standards of Decency and the New Suffrage Movement
Eighth Amendment case law has often evoked consideration of the
“evolving standards of decency” that transforms as society matures.117
“Evolving standards”118 open the door for discussion about preserving
the constitutional right to vote for incarcerated persons. Although this
standard has usually been used to address oppressive and
unconstitutionally cruel prison conditions119 or unduly harsh
punishments,120 it is available to address the broader collateral
consequences of criminal conviction.121
The tide of public opinion on felon disenfranchisement is changing.
Recently, voters in Florida issued a resounding rejection of the state’s
permanent disenfranchisement of over 1.4 million people who had felony
convictions, with the passage of Florida Amendment Four, or the Voting
Rights Restoration for Felons Initiative.122 Before the passage of the
116. See Wilkins, supra note 80, at 100 (“When presented with Eighth Amendment
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws, judges typically rely on . . . Richardson v. Ramirez
for the proposition that disenfranchisement is constitutionally permitted no matter what.”).
117. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269-70 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Ours
would indeed be a simple task were we required merely to measure a challenged punishment against
those that history has long condemned. That narrow and unwarranted view of the Clause, however,
was left behind with the 19th century. Our task today is more complex. We know ‘that the words
of the [Clause] are not precise, and that their scope is not static.’ We know, therefore, that the
Clause ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958))).
118. The theory that a practice may be prohibited when a “national consensus has formed
against it” and “a majority of state have already done so on their own.” See Lain, supra note 77.
119. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333-34 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding filthy cell
conditions—including dried fecal matter on the walls, ceilings, and bars, as well as areas with no
air-conditioning during the summer, both of which exacerbate the infestation of pests—constitute
an Eighth Amendment violation).
120. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (finding the use of denationalization—
stripping a native-born American of their United States citizenship—to be cruel and unusual
punishment and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
121. See generally Wilkins, supra note 80, at 129 (proposing “courts should presume that a
state-imposed sanction or disability triggered directly and automatically by a criminal conviction
is, in fact, punishment subject to Eighth Amendment regulation.”).
122. See Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida [https://perma.cc/
DN62-PW5Y] (“On November 6, 2018, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment
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referendum, the Eleventh Circuit had already ruled that Florida’s method
of restoring (or not restoring) voting rights for felons violated the First
Amendment freedom of association and freedom of expression.123 This
is the latest example of the public issuing a referendum on the age old
practice of civil death, but certainly not the only.124
Civil death is counterproductive to successful rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Recidivism increases when laws are confusing
and not clarified to supervised persons125 and criminalize positive reentry behaviors like civic participation.126 In Texas, voting rights are
automatically restored upon the completion of one’s sentence, but there
has been confusion, even amongst election officials, about how to apply

automatically restoring the right to vote to 1.4 million individuals with felony convictions in
their past. The amendment restores the right to vote for people with felony convictions,
except individuals convicted of murder or felony sexual offenses, once they have completed the
terms of their sentence, including probation and parole.”); see also Emily Bazelon, Will Florida’s
Ex-Felons Finally Regain the Right to Vote?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/ex-felons-voting-rights-florida.html [https://perma.cc/8LS2S27C] (detailing the history of Florida’s Amendment 4 and the effects it can have on former felons
like Neil Volz and restoring democracy in government).
123. Order Granting Summary Judgment at 8, Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289
(N.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00128-MW-CAS), http://fairelectionsnetwork.com/
wp-content/uploads/144-Order-Granting-Plaintiffs-Motion-for-Summary-Judgment.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CMV8-7DZ7] (“Defendants essentially argue that vote-restoration for former felons can
only occur on the state’s terms. ECF No. 103, at 30-31. Once a felon loses the right to vote, only
the state may grant it back in a manner of its choosing. A person convicted of a crime may have
long ago exited the prison cell and completed probation. Her voting rights, however, remain locked
in a dark crypt. Only the state has the key—but the state has swallowed it. Only when the state
has digested and passed that key in the unforeseeable future—maybe in five years, maybe in 50—
along with the possibility of some virus-laden stew of viewpoint discrimination and partisan,
religious, or racial bias, does the state in an “act of mercy,” unlock the former felon’s voting rights
from its hiding place.”) (citing Fla. R. Exec. Clemency 1).
124. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Dec. 21, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5N5X-GPMY]
(detailing state policies regarding felon disenfranchisement and recent state efforts to towards the
restoration of voting rights).
125. See, e.g., Sasha von Olderhausen, ‘I Wish I Could Vote’: An Ex-Felon’s Election Day,
TEX. OBSERVER (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:38 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/felon-disenfranchise
ment-presidio/ [https://perma.cc/T5WT-JW2W] (illustrating an ex-felon’s misconception of his
right to vote).
126. See, e.g., id. (finding 2.9% of eligible voters, not including eligible voters who have
failed to re-enter the system, are prohibited from voting because of state felony disenfranchisement
laws).
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the law.127 However, even though voting rights are eventually restored,
there is the risk of prosecution if someone mistakenly believes they have
the right to vote.128 The risk of going back to prison has been actualized
in Texas for casting a provisional ballot.129
In 2016, in Fort Worth, Texas, Crystal Mason, a Black woman, decided
to vote after being persuaded by her mother.130 Mason had been released
from federal prison after serving a sentence for tax fraud and was still
under federal supervision.131 She believed she could vote and went to
cast her ballot, but ultimately cast a provisional ballot (a ballot that
ultimately did not count) after discovering she was not on the voter
rolls.132 No one at the polling location told her that she could not vote,
even though at least one person there knew she had a felony
conviction.133 She was ultimately prosecuted for voting illegally and
sentenced to five years in prison.134 This sentence is one example of the
injustice of civil death and the ways in which it can be applied harshly
producing grave consequences to an individual, particularly because the
sentence levied against Mason, who is both Black and a woman, was
disproportionate. Sentences like these have a chilling effect. When
utilizing the right to vote can potentially cost a person their freedom,
especially those who have already experienced the loss of liberty in a cell,

127. Letter from Ann McGeehan, supra note 87 (addressing the confusion associated with
voter registration and final felony convictions).
128. Brief for ACLU & Texas Civil Rights Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant
at 2, Texas v. Mason, No. D432-1485710-00 (432nd Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex. 2018),
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/mason_amicus_brief_5.23.18_final.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5NDL-5GLC] (“Any mistake—no matter how innocent—will be penalized with
the full force of the criminal law. Such a message, if not rejected . . . will inevitably chill
participation in elections and undermine the strength of our democracy.”).
129. Id. (rejecting the State’s position of criminalizing an “innocent mistake made is casting
a provisional ballot.”) (emphasis original).
130. Mitch Mitchell, Texas Woman Who Got Five Years in Prison Among Six Million in
U.S. Who Gave Up Right To Vote, STAR TELEGRAM (Mar. 29, 2018, 9:50 PM), https://www.startelegram.com/news/local/community/fort-worth/article207391024.html [https://perma.cc/3EFJDCP8].
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol21/iss2/1

24

Harrison Stevens et al.: Handcuffing the Vote

2019]

HANDCUFFING THE VOTE

219

the cost can be too high to pay to participate in representative
democracy.135
Considering the discriminatory history of felon disenfranchisement
laws, the unequal practice of counting prisoners into voting populations
of which they have no civic influence, and the ongoing discriminatory
impact of felon disenfranchisement laws, there is only one reasonable
conclusion: people with felony convictions should not be stripped of
voting privileges at all. Forfeiture of voting privileges upon conviction
has been widely accepted,136 but there is no constitutional requirement
that it remain in place. As opinions about voting change and the public
becomes more educated about the inequities of our criminal justice
system, disenfranchisement moored to criminality will likely become
unpopular.
The Eighth Amendment is an appropriate vehicle to push for
changes in this area because it is not “static”,137 rather, it is malleable
enough to encapsulate modern changes in society.138 This is apparent
throughout Eighth Amendment case law and especially in jurisprudence
outlawing once widely accepted practices like the death penalty for
crimes that did not result in a death,139 life without parole for

135. Brief for ACLU & Texas Civil Rights Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant
at 11, Texas v. Mason, No. D432-1485710-00 (432nd Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex. 2018),
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/mason_amicus_brief_5.23.18_final.pd
f [https://perma.cc/5NDL-5GLC] (suggesting there is little support explaining why a person would
risk up to twenty years in prison just to cast a ballot in an election).
136. See, e.g., Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the
Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1536 (2003) (finding only 9.9% of
people surveyed believe that convicted felons should never lose their right to vote while 35.2%
believe felons should lose their right to vote while they are incarcerated, on parole, or probation).
137. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (“The Court recognized in that case
that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society”); see also Wilkins, supra note 80, at 137 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s scope is not static,
but may expand as society progresses.”).
138. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding the Eighth
Amendment to be judged under a contemporary standard of decency); see also Lain, supra note 77,
at 674-75.
139. See e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) modified 554 U.S. 945
(2008) (holding the Eighth Amendment barred Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the
rape of a child that did not result in death because “[i]n most cases justice is not better served by
terminating the life of the perpetrator rather than confining him and preserving the possibility that
he and the system will find ways to allow him to understand the enormity of his offense.”).
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juveniles,140 and the practice of executing those with intellectual
development disorders.141 In other words, Eighth Amendment case law
has developed alongside society, and the Court has found many
punishments to violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause once
they lose public popularity.142
Contrary to the Court’s dicta in Richardson,143 the Fifth Circuit
expressly stated that “while an Eighth Amendment determination must
not be merely a judge’s subjective views, the Constitution contemplates
that ultimately a court’s own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question.”144 Even without express judicial acquiescence, it is axiomatic
that subjective views enter judicial interpretation. In dicta, the Fifth
Circuit reinforced transforming values can render once-accepted actions
unconstitutional.145 Admittedly, challenges to felon disenfranchisement
have largely failed, but bringing a claim challenging the practice of
gerrymandering prisons in tandem with a challenge to the loss of voting
privileges might produce some favor.
First, the Court would have to determine that felon disenfranchisement
in Texas was punishment, not merely regulation.146 In other contexts,
140. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-78 (2012) (noting that sentencing a juvenile
to life without parole fails to account for hallmarks of youth, like failure to appreciate consequences
for actions, dysfunctional home environments that a child may not be able to remove themselves
from, and peer pressures).
141. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002) (detailing states which changed
their laws to no longer allow death penalties for those with intellectual developmental disorders
after public protests called for an end to the imminent execution of a man diagnosed with
intellectual developmental deficiencies).
142. Lain, supra note 77, at 668-69 (“For the purpose of this discussion, what mattered in
Furman was that two concurring Justices—Justices Brennan and Marshall—made a bold doctrinal
move in suggesting that a punishment could be “cruel and unusual” for no reason other than that it
had become unpopular.”) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 270 n.10, 277-306 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 332-72 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
143. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974) (addressing the respondent’s pleas, the
Court deferred to legislative action and stated, “ . . . it is not for us to choose one set of values over
the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they advocate is indeed the more
enlightened and sensible one, presumably the people of the State of California will ultimately come
around to that view.”).
144. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir. 1986).
145. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding corporal
punishment of school children was acceptable under the Eighth Amendment because the practice
had not become “unacceptable to contemporary society” or “abhor[r]ed by popular sentiment”).
146. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (analyzing the legal grounds of forfeiture
as a punishment, then referring to the legislative history of the statute in question to determine if
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the Court said sanctions serve more than one purpose and sanctions partly
serving as punishment are punitive.147
Next, the Court determines if the punishment of disenfranchisement is
cruel and unusual. The Court will consider if the punishment is contrary
to the “evolving standards of decency” and disproportionate.148 In Trop,
the court provided some contours for determining what punishment
offended the standards of a civilized society.149 The Court usually
considers objective criteria such as the current position of state laws,
proposed legislation, jury behavior, public opinion polls, professional
organization opinions and international law.150 These objective criteria
illuminate the current climate and help judges make decisions tied to
some external source. However, we must caution that the Court is
privileged to decide what weight to give the evidence before it and,
notably, the Court has not always weighed different criteria the same,
and, finally, it is also required to find a constitutional violation if one
exists, notwithstanding public opinion.151
Therefore, the Court could find that the punishment of
disenfranchisement, combined with the unequal representation created by
prison gerrymandering, is contrary to the evolving standards of decency.
It could anchor its opinion in international law like it did in Trop or
consider the wave of states loosening laws on felon disenfranchisement
coupled with citizen initiatives as strong indicia that public sentiments

Congress intended the statute to be punishing or remedial); see also Wilkins, supra note 80, at 13941 (reviewing judicial opinions, statutory interpretation, and opinion polls to show a marked shift
towards generally understanding disenfranchisement to be punitive).
147. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1997), abrogated by Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (“. . . it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.”).
148. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332-333 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976)).
149. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”).
150. Wilkins, supra note 80, at 139 (analyzing the courts using these methods, but also
pointing out Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002),
arguing that other countries should not determine the United States response).
151. Lain, supra note 77, at 672-673 & nn. 52-55 (comparing Supreme Court decisions that
either rejected or leaned heavily on various sources of arguments in determining whether there was
an Eighth Amendment violation).
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have changed.152 Undoubtedly, reclaiming the franchise of incarcerated
persons poses a great challenge because the public has not yet made
formidable attempts to restore the vote for prisoners.153 Only two states
allow prisoners to vote currently, but others are taking notice and
reconsidering civil death in light of massive incarceration rates.154 Still,
change is often incremental and the legal and public challenges to felon
disenfranchisement laws for previously incarcerated persons could
produce more public scrutiny of the process overall.
4. Texas Must Change Its Ways: Unlock the Vote for Prisoners
Texas need not wait for litigation or subsequent court action. Rather,
Texas should be required to make a choice: either count prisoners in their
home jurisdictions or allow them to vote. The reasons for allowing
prisoners to vote are manifold and manifest, and they have been
expounded upon at length in law review articles and news articles

152. Sarah C. Grady, Civil Death Is Different: An Examination of a Post Graham Challenge
to Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Eighth Amendment, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441,
464-65 (2013).
153. See Pinaire et al., supra note 136 (finding 9.9% of persons surveyed said that
they believed convicted felons should never lose their right to vote). But see State Advocacy News:
Strategies to End Life Imprisonment, Expand the Vote, and Strengthen Reentry Policies,
SENTENCING PROJECT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/state-advo
cacy-news-strategies-end-life-imprisonment-expand-vote-strengthen-reentry-policies/ (discussing
Florida voters’ passage of Amendment Four to the Florida Constitution, enfranchising around one
million Floridians who had lost the right to vote due to felony convictions, sparking lawmakers and
advocates in California, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Kentucky to advance
similarly restorative measures); Exec. Order No. 181, Restoring the Right to Vote for New Yorkers
on Parole (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
EO_181.pdf (Governor Andrew Cuomo expanded voting rights to those on parole, voting rights to
those on probation had already been granted); Brianne Pfannenstiel, Exclusive: Gov. Kim Reynolds
to Propose Constitutional Amendment Lifting Felon Voting Ban in Condition of the State, DES
MOINES REG. (Jan. 15, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/
2019/01/15/kim-reynolds-felon-voting-rights-constitutional-amendment-lift-ban-iowa-legislatureproposal-2019/2572308002/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=83282a7b-68d9-4309-a713-c9eae9
e97829 [https://perma.cc/X2X6-QESY] (broadcasting an interview with Governor Kim Reynolds
of Iowa on future legislative agendas that would restore voting rights to felons).
154. See Jane Timm, Most States Disenfranchise Felons, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/states-rethink-prisoner-voting-rights-incarcerati
on-rates-rise-n850406 [https://perma.cc/39RV-QP4N] (reporting that New Jersey’s legislature
plans on proposing a bill that would allow prisoners to vote, modeled on Maine and Vermont where
prisoners can currently vote).
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alike.155 But since only Maine and Vermont allow currently incarcerated
persons to vote (and both Massachusetts and Utah recently revoked such
a right), the reasons evidently still bear repeating. If one of the goals of
prison time is rehabilitation, one of the best ways to produce civic
responsibility is to get incarcerated persons in the habit of voting as soon
as possible. Prisoners must be allowed to vote for the very reasons that
all United States citizens are allowed and encouraged to vote: voting
integrates and entrenches the voter in society, voting connects voters to
one another as co-citizens and participants, and voters with experience in
a system are the most qualified to vote on policies to guide that system.
If prisoners are meant to become productive members of society, why
wouldn’t that journey begin as soon as possible?
The United States prison system is either meant to be rehabilitative
or punitive, depending on who and when you ask. Some prisons in
the United States once aimed for rehabilitation, becoming places in
which inmates were “encouraged to develop occupational skills and to
resolve psychological problems—such as substance abuse or
aggression—that might interfere with their reintegration into

155. See, e.g., Anthony Gray, Securing Felons’ Voting Rights in America, 16 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 19 (2014) (“[Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution] is
indicative of the fact that a universal franchise is fundamental to the representative system of
government for which the Constitution provides . . . numerous amendments . . . prohibit denial of
voting rights, for example due to race, ‘previous servitude,’ gender, age or failure to pay tax are
constitutionally forbidden.”); Marc Mauer, Voting Behind Bars: An Argument for Voting by
Prisoners, 54 HOWARD L.J. 549, 559 (2011) (“ . . . [Disenfranchisement] policies exacerbate many
of the problems associated with disenfranchisement . . . they create significant limitations on full
democratic participation by citizens, run counter to efforts to promote public safety, and exacerbate
existing inequalities in the criminal justice system. These include limitations on the electorate,
enhanced racial disparity, and exacerbating challenges for reentry.”); Gregg Caruso, Why
Prisoners and Ex-Felons Should Retain the Right to Vote, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 6, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/unjust-deserts/201611/why-prisoners-and-ex-felonsshould-retain-the-right-vote
[https://perma.cc/9NSJ-R2UY]
(“[D]isempowering
and
disenfranchising prisoners and ex-felons has the effect of dehumanizing and marginalizing
them, sometimes permanently. Philosophically arbitrary and perpetual punishment, including
the denial of voting rights to people who have paid their debt, imposed second-class citizenship on
millions of citizens.”); Corey Brettschneider, Why Prisoners Deserve the Right to Vote,
POLITICO MAG. (June 21, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/prisonersconvicts-felons-inmates-right-to-vote-enfranchise-criminal-justice-voting-rights-213979 [https://
perma.cc/7RT6-3DSN] (“Prison is itself already severe punishment. The deprivation of liberty and
the loss of control over everyday interaction, including the ability to see one’s loved ones on a daily
basis, are all severe constraints imposed by incarceration. One can be punished without being
subjected to civic exile.”).
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society.”156 In the 1970s, the emerging (and persisting) “tough on
crime” political tactic meant that prisons became merely punitive for
those housed within;157 incarceration was “an instrument of society’s
retributive vengeance” for harming those whom it viewed as dangerous,
while simultaneously exorcising that danger from the lives of the
supposedly righteous.158 More recently, advocates have pushed for a
return to the rehabilitative prison model, citing both moral159 and
economic advantages.160 The United States does an abysmal job of
rehabilitating its prisoners,161 especially compared to more intentionally
palliative European programs.162 This Article assumes, arguendo, that
rehabilitation is supposed to be the U.S. prison system’s primary goal.
Inmate participation in democracy would create reintegration for
inmates rejoining American society at large. Voters are more invested in
the workings of their government, the issues that affect society, and more

156. Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, July/Aug. 2003, at
46, https://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug03/rehab.aspx [https://perma.cc/FS4Q-FJCT].
157. See id. (“Researchers have also found that the pessimistic “nothing works” attitude
toward rehabilitation that helped justify punitive prison policies in the 1970s was overstated.”).
158. Austin MacCormick, The Prison’s Role in Crime Prevention, 41 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 36, 37-38 (1950-1951).
159. See, e.g. Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, Opinion, We Must Do More to Rehabilitate Inmates,
HILL (Jan. 26, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/international/370908-we-must-do-more-torehabilitate-us-inmates [https://perma.cc/3LEN-LBEN] (arguing that rehabilitation programs can
help inmates deal with stress and emotions, and that rehabilitation should be taken with a more
holistic approach like that of medical care).
160. Jacob Reich, The Economic Impact of Prison Rehabilitation Programs,
PENN WHARTON (August 17, 2017), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/2059-theeconomic-impact-of-prison-rehabilitation/for-students/blog/news.php [https://perma.cc/6FJ6-VS
CE] (citing case studies showing thousands of dollars in savings for states that implement
rehabilitative programs like work-release programs, drug and alcohol treatment, and education).
161. See, e.g., Christopher Zoukis, U.S. Prisoners the Least Rehabilitated in the World,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-prisoners-the-leastrehabilitated-in-the-world_us_59bd49eae4b06b71800c39d7 [https://perma.cc/QNM4-867E] (“In
addition to locking people up at unprecedented rates, America also lays claim to the highest
recidivism rate in the word—a staggering 76 percent. Compare that with Norway, which boasts
the lowest rate at just 20 percent.”).
162. Zeeshan Aleem, Sweden’s Remarkable Prison System Has Done What the U.S. Won’t
Even Consider, MIC NETWORK INC. (Jan. 27, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/109138/sweden-hasdone-for-its-prisoners-what-the-u-s-won-t#.3gRSqrXea [https://perma.cc/2L64-DFYU] (“[I]n the
past decade, the number of Swedish prisoners has dropped from 5,722 to 4,500 out of a population
of 9.5 million. The country has closed a number of prisons, and the recidivism rate is around 40%,
which is far less than in the U.S. and most European countries.”).
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personally, the issues that affect them.163 If prisoners were universally
enfranchised, rehabilitation would be aided by increasing their
investment in their communities and paving the way in becoming more
effective members of society upon release.164
If prison is meant to take a transgressor and turn him into a productive
member of society, then voting is an indispensable step in that process.
Incarceration inherently separates the incarcerated from the rest of
America in every way, including physically. That separation often
continues long after release, leading to staggering levels of recidivism
(nearly 77% according to a Bureau of Justice report), a massive
rehabilitative failure.165 Voting is a simple and logical way to keep
inmates connected to the population they will one day rejoin.
Voting involves the voter in their respective communities in distinct
ways other civic activities do not. Voting is more intentional than paying
taxes, more convenient than attending a city council meeting, and more
enjoyable than getting a speeding ticket. Even before elections were
widely available to non-White non-males, those who examined American
democracy expounded upon the uniquely participatory power of the vote.
In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America credited “the
interrelationship between the self and the community” as the cornerstone
of American democracy, enabling Americans to “reconcile their personal
well-being with the common welfare of the people.”166 If inmates were
163. See PEW RES. CTR., MOST VOTERS HAVE POSITIVE VIEWS OF THEIR MIDTERM
VOTING EXPERIENCES 14 (2018), http://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/
12/12-17-18-Voter-experiences-upt.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL4V-PDTA] (reporting that a large
portion of those who did not vote in the midterm elections in 2018 did not like politics, felt their
vote did not matter, or did not care who won).
164. See Brettschneider, supra note 155 (“As prisons have grappled with the explosion in
their populations in the past 20 years, allegations of prisoner maltreatment multiply, and criminal
justice reform moves to the fore of our political debate, we should consider that one of the best
ways to solve these intractable and expensive problems would be to listen to those currently
incarcerated—and to allow them to represent themselves in our national political
conversation. . . . A prison constituency with rights to vote and related rights of free speech can
engage in civic activism that will continue after release.”).
165. Matthew R. Durose et al., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005:
Patterns from 2005 to 2010 U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS 7 (Apr. 2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf (reporting that rearrests after release of
inmates was 43.4% one year after release, rising to 67.8% three years after release, and finally
76.6% five years after release).
166. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 72 (trans. Henry Reeve, ed.
Francis Bowen, 3d ed. 1863) (1835).
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allowed to vote while incarcerated, they would be consistently connecting
their choices and personal well-being to the good of the community they
are meant to rejoin. Such a connection has great potential to set a pattern
of involvement and empathy with the larger population that will continue
long after an inmate has been released. In other words, what the crime
has torn asunder, voting can glue together.
In addition to reintegrating inmates into society, the right to vote
humanizes those who possess it. Voting is “regarded as a fundamental
political right, because it is preservative of all rights.”167 These truths
were known to the Women’s Suffrage and Civil Rights Movements alike,
and America has seen them borne as non-White non-males gained the
right to vote.
Much like the fight for inmate suffrage, the war for women’s suffrage
was waged on many fronts—litigation, policy, public opinion, and state
policy—for many years, propelled by the notion that women would not
be full citizens until they were awarded full participation. Susan B.
Anthony’s argument for women’s suffrage articulated this idea perfectly:
It was we, the people; not we, the white male citizens; nor yet we, the male
citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union. And we formed
it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not to the half of
ourselves and the half of our posterity, but to the whole people.168

Other suffragists improved upon Anthony’s limited platform of
suffrage which, unfortunately, involved opposition to the Fourteenth
Amendment because of its inclusion of the word “male.”169 The
successful Black publisher and activist Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin
declared herself “justified in believing that the success of this movement,
for equality of the sexes means more progress toward equality of the
races.”170 But the fight was not over once women won the right to vote.
Suffragettes still had to convince womankind to show up to the polls.

167. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
168. Susan B. Anthony, On Women’s Right to Vote (1873), http://www.historyplace.com/
speeches/anthony.htm [https://perma.cc/AH9P-RE5F].
169. Jone Johnson Lewis, Women’s Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, THOUGHTCO.
(June 4, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/womens-rights-and-the-fourteenth-amendment-3529
473 [https://perma.cc/J7PE-SYTH].
170. Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin, Trust the Women!, in 10 THE CRISIS: VOTES FOR WOMEN
no. 1, at 188 (May 1915).
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Author Louisa May Alcott, the first woman to register in Concord,
Massachusetts, groused in her journal about the reluctance of her fellow
Concord women to cast a ballot, and even “offered to drive the timid
sheep to the fatal spot where they seem to expect some awful doom.”171
Eventually, women began to show up on their own free will, and they
began electing women whose policies reflected their own.172 Similarly,
the struggle for Black men’s suffrage only began with the ratification of
the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, which was followed by a long period
of poll taxes, literacy test, grandfather clauses, and other barriers to
voting.173 The road has been long, and is paved with the blood of
innocent protestors and leaders seeking the participation that the
Constitution already promised them.174 More so than women’s suffrage,
Black Americans’ rights to vote are still under attack, and the PrisonIndustrial complex exacerbates the challenge.175 But the Congress
elected in November was the most diverse yet, leaving open the
possibility that the policies passed by that Congress will expand
opportunities for People of Color in the future.176

171. LOUISA MAY ALCOTT, THE JOURNALS OF LOUISA MAY ALCOTT (Joel Myerson &
Daniel Shealy eds., 1989).
172. See History of Women in the U.S. Congress, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL.,
http://cawp.rutgers.edu/history-women-us-congress [https://perma.cc/UKH5-58XS] (showing the
number of women in both the House and Senate from one woman in the House of Representatives
during the sixty-fifth legislature to a total of 110 women in the 150th legislature).
173. Libr. of Congress, 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, WEB GUIDES,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/15thamendment.html
[https://perma.cc/RD7K-28
2S].
174. See From Selma to Shelby County: Working Together to Restore the Protections of the
Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement
of Representative Hon. John Lewis) (“In many parts of this country, people were denied the right
to register to vote simply because of the color of their skin. They were harassed, intimidated, and
fired from their jobs and forced off of farms and plantations. Those who tried to assist were beaten,
arrested, jailed, or even murdered. Before the Voting Rights Act, people stood in unmovable
lines.”).
175. See Vann R. Newkirk II, In the Georgia Governor’s Race, the Game is Black Votes,
THE ATL. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/georgia-racemired-minority-vote-suppression-charges/572854/ [https://perma.cc/W3N5-S8RK] (describing the
difficulties Black people faced registering and voting for Georgia’s 2018 midterm and gubernatorial
races).
176. Richie Zweigenhaft, The 116th Congress Has More Women and People of Color Than
Ever, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://theconversation.com/the-116thcongress-has-more-women-and-people-of-color-than-ever-but-theres-still-room-to-improve-1059
30 [https://perma.cc/L89H-W3BJ].
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Inmate suffrage is no different from the movements before it. It is
simply the next frontier. Prisoners are notoriously neglected by
politicians. Giving them the right to vote would require politicians to
visit prisons, see the conditions, and advocate policies that improve the
lives of the incarcerated citizens of their district.177 Accountability is
even more reduced in Texas since prisoners are counted where they bunk
when drawing electoral districts.178 Incarcerated people are full citizens,
but since they cannot vote, their representatives have no incentive to
actually represent them.179 Prisons are like neighborhoods entirely
zoned out of voting. Inmates deserve the right to vote for candidates of
their choice whom they believe will represent their interests and, if they
desire, reflect their own community.
CONCLUSION
Leaders of all parties and persuasions sound the call to United States
citizens to get out and vote.180 Inmates are in a unique situation among
Americans in that they are acknowledged as full citizens, but unable to
claim a right to participate in running their own nation. To paraphrase a
quote from suffragette Amelia Bloomer: it will not do to say that it is out
of the inmate’s sphere to assist in making laws, for if that were so, then it

177. Brettschneider, supra note 155.
178. Ramsey, supra note 38.
179. Brettschneider, supra note 155.
180. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Barack Obama: You Need to Vote Because Our Democracy
Depends on It, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2018, 6:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/sep/08/barack-obama-you-need-to-vote-because-our-democracy-depends-on
-it [https://perma.cc/KC8Q-5KV3] (“But when there’s a vacuum in our democracy, when we
don’t vote, when we take our basic rights and freedoms for granted, when we turn away and stop
paying attention and stop engaging and stop believing and look for the newest diversion . . . then
other voices fill the void.”); Patrick Svitek, In U.S. Senate Race, Both Sides Take Heart in Massive
Early Voting Numbers, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/10/27/ussenate-ted-cruz-beto-orourke-see-promise-massive-early-voting/ [https://perma.cc/S8UQ-3ZKS]
(statement by Ted Cruz during 2018 midterm elections: “I have always said if Texans show up and
vote, we are going to have a very good election. Texans are showing up to vote.”). But see David
C. Barker & Christopher Jan Carman, This is Why So Many Republicans Are Ready to Ignore Public
Opinion on Health Care, WASH. POST (June 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/27/this-is-why-so-many-republicans-are-ready-to-buck-public-opinionon-health-care/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ef9a0fa9b37c
[https://perma.cc/GD8N-AVHY]
(describing a study showing that Republican representatives do not often lead in accordance with
their constituents polling preferences, exercising “trustee-style” representation).
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should be also out of her sphere to submit to them.181

181. Amelia Bloomer, ATHENA UNLIMITED (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.athenaunlimited.
com/empowerher-blog/amelia-bloomer [https://perma.cc/ELF9-CK2M].
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